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Bubbles: Towards a Typology 
Player: 
Croupier: 
Player:      
Croupier: 
Player:  
Croupier:  
Player:  
Croupier: 
How much to play?  
Three billion. 
Who’ll be playing? 
We won’t know until they show up. 
What are the rules? 
Those will emerge as the game unfolds. 
What are my odds of winning? 
We can’t say. Do you still want to play? 
Arthur (1996, p. 104) 
Introduction 
Bubbles – periodic episodes where hype about an asset outpaces reasonable 
expectations about valuing the asset (Garber, 1990; Sheeran and Spain, 2004) – have been a 
part of modern economic history, including of course the notorious tulipmania in the 
Netherlands of the 17th century (Dash, 2000; Frankel, 2000; Galbraith, 1993; Garber, 2001; 
Perez, 2002; 2009). While bubbles are about the value of the underlying asset (Camerer, 1989; 
Siegel, 2003), the formation, inflation, hyper-enlargement and eventual bursting of bubbles 
cannot be understood in merely financial-economic terms.  Bubbles are also socio-political-
cultural phenomena, with intense and accelerating interactions of engineered hype and 
feverish expectations (Compton and Ozler, 2011; Turcan, 2011). It is therefore important to 
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view bubbles in a multidisciplinary frame; indeed, the language of bubbles is permeating fields 
beyond finance and economics (see, for example, Ekström and Glans 2011). A goal of our 
ongoing research stream is to develop a multidisciplinary metatheory of bubbles. In this 
viewpoint paper we put forward a typology of bubbles by comparing four types of assets – 
entertainment, commodities, financial securities (stocks), and housing properties – where 
bubbles could and do form occasionally. Cutting across and comparing such varied asset types 
provides some rich insights into the nature of bubbles – and offers an inductive way to arrive at 
the typology of bubbles. 
 
In this viewpoint paper, we ground inductively the emergent typology of bubbles and 
related types, along with their dimensions in the extant empirical realm as well as in the 
emergent theoretical frames derived from some work on bubbles (e.g., Turcan 2010; 2011). We 
view the emergent typology of bubbles as a middle-range theory that we see as a catalyst for a 
dynamic scholarly conversation and future research, leading eventually to the development of a 
robust behavioral grand theory of bubbles. According to Weick (1989, p. 521), middle-range 
theories are solutions to problems that contain a limited number of assumptions and 
considerable accuracy and detail in the problem specification. In this viewpoint paper, middle-
range theorizing helped us manage the complexity of the emergent typology of bubbles and 
related types.  
 
As to the process of theory building, we side with Dubin (1978, p. 96) who maintains 
that empirically relevant theory in the behavioral and social sciences is built upon the 
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acceptance of the notion of relationship rather than of the notion of causality. This does not 
mean that causality (or prediction) is of secondary or lower importance. It means we have 
employed a theory building strategy firstly aimed at improving understanding before seeking to 
improve prediction: hence understanding the core asset-linked dimensions and as well as 
boundary meta-dimensions of the emergent typology of bubbles and related types.  
 
In the sections that follow, first we present the three core asset-linked dimensions and 
four boundary meta-dimensions for understanding bubble processes. Next, we put forward the 
typology of bubbles by pulling together the core asset-linked dimensions and the boundary 
meta-dimensions of bubbles. We round out this viewpoint paper with some integrative and 
concluding remarks. 
Asset-Linked Dimensions of the Typology  
Regardless of the type of asset, three core asset-linked dimensions are important for 
bubbles to form, to inflate (often rapidly and dramatically), and eventually to burst: (1) 
perceived asset availability, (2) perceived asset value, and (3) perceived asset communication. 
Table 1 compares the asset types1 – entertainment (such as movies), commodities (such as 
minerals or agricultural commodities), financial securities or stocks (such as shares of 
technology companies), and housing (such as real estate property values in a metro area) – on 
                                                        
1
 Types of assets where bubble processes could emerge are varied: new technologies and innovations (including 
financial innovations), high-tech products and services (and related financial securities or stocks), fashion items, 
entertainment products such as movies, and indeed many sophisticated derivative financial instruments that 
convert an otherwise slow-traded asset into a hyper-traded asset (see e.g., Galbraith, 1993; Martin 2011; Perez, 
2003; 2009; Schmitt 2009; Turcan 2011).  
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these three dimensions: (1) those affecting availability of an asset, (2) those affecting valuation 
of an asset, and (3) those affecting communications about an asset. Each dimension has 
multiple factors that play some role in the formation and inflation (and eventual bursting) of 
bubbles.  
Bubbles and perceived asset availability 
The first dimension concerns the perceived asset availability: how graspable, how 
comprehensible, how much available (how readily, how easily, how scarce, how abundant), 
when, where? The set of factors that define this dimension is about whether an underlying 
asset is creatable, consumable, storable, duplicable, divisible, renewable, perishable, 
depletable, or destroyable. We term these factors as availability-related factors.  
 
All assets – with the exception of minerals – are creatable, but the pace and conditions 
that affect asset creation vary greatly. This gives rise to perceived supply-demand imbalances, 
which of course is a basic condition to initiate a bubble. Even a movie – such as a new Harry 
Potter release – could experience a temporary supply-demand imbalance with lines at the box 
office on the release date. Supply and demand, especially for bubble-prone assets, are 
perceptual states – it is perceived shortage, and the feeling that prices will rise (or the asset will 
disappear) and the deal must be done quickly, that contribute to the inflation of bubbles. 
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Table 1: Comparing Core Asset-Linked Dimensions and their Factors by Asset Types 
Is the 
underlying 
asset… 
Asset Type 
(Examples) 
Notes and Comments Entertainment 
(Avatar - the 
movie) 
Commodity 
(Silver, Hog 
Bellies) 
Financial Stock 
(Google) 
Housing 
(Shanghai 
mansion) 
DIMENSION: PERCEIVED ASSET AVAILABILITY 
Creatable? Yes Yes or No Yes Yes Agri-commodities are 
creatable 
Consumable? Yes Yes No Yes Houses are consumed 
as durable goods 
Storable? Yes Yes Yes Yes But see also the 
Perishable dimension 
Duplicable? Yes No No No Low or no marginal cost 
per digital copy 
Divisible? No Yes Often Yes Yes Stock-splits are used to 
divide financial stocks 
Renewable? No Yes or No No No Minerals are non-
renewable 
Perishable? No Yes or No No No Agro-commodities are 
perishable 
Depletable? No Yes No No Minerals more 
depletable than Agri-
commodities 
Destroyable? No Yes or No Usually No Usually No Agri-commodities are 
often destroyable 
DIMENSION: PERCEIVED ASSET VALUE 
Depreciable? Yes Yes or No No Yes In the accounting sense 
(losing value with age) 
Appreciable? Yes Yes No Rarely Yes In the collector sense 
(rarity, scarcity) 
Tradable? No Yes Yes No Refers to tradability on 
an exchange 
Wagerable? No Yes Yes No Refers to wagerability 
on an exchange 
DIMENSION: PERCEIVED ASSET COMMUNICATION 
Discussable? Yes No Yes No Internet has increased 
discussability 
Reviewable? Yes No Yes Yes Internet has increased 
reviewability 
Hypeable? Yes Yes Yes Yes Internet has increased 
hypeability 
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Bubbles and perceived asset value 
The second core dimension pertains to the perceived asset value: how to value an asset 
that does not exist, or how to evaluate the promise of an emerging new asset? The valuation-
related factors aim to understand whether an underlying asset is depreciable, appreciable, 
tradable, or wagerable. In economic terms, there is an implied inverse relationship between 
perceived availability and perceived valuation of an asset: the asset that appears to be scarcer 
is valued more highly.  
 
Hence, beyond the perceived availability factors, the main factors affecting bubbles are 
the perceived asset value dimensions – particularly the ability to trade (in an exchange) or bet 
(again, in an organized exchange) on the asset. At the height of tulipmania, sometimes the 
ownership of a tulip bulb (still planted in the ground) changed hands as much as 8-10 times in a 
day, via auction houses (Dash, 2000). Financial engineering or financial innovation (e.g., Perez, 
2009) – the ability to craft derivatives for almost anything – has injected tradability and 
wagerability (the ability to place bets, in stock or commodity exchanges) in asset categories that 
were previously not tradable or wagerable. The housing bubble in the U.S. (Baker, 2007) that 
burst in 2007 was fueled largely by the creation of Credit Default Swaps, derivatives that 
allowed trading and wagering on home mortgage debt notes (Cohan, 2009). In this sense, the 
portrayal shown in Table 1 is a cross-sectional snapshot, reflective of the closing years of the 
20th century. Indeed, the Internet has accelerated tradability and wagerability – as well as 
discussability, reviewability, and hypeability – of all asset types. Hence, a future portrayal of 
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Table 1 would likely look somewhat different (with more evidence and examples available for 
all these processes) than the one shown here. 
Bubbles and perceived asset communication 
The third and final core dimension relates to perceived asset communication: how can 
the target stakeholders distinguish between hype and reality; how much can the rules be bent; 
how many ‘legitimacy lies’ – defined as “intentional misrepresentations of the facts” 
(Rutherford et al., 2009, p. 950) – can be told without bursting an inflating bubble? This 
dimension consists of three factors: communication related factors that are trying to explain 
whether an underlying asset is (a) discussable, (b) reviewable, or (c) hypeable. Intense and 
frequent communications are necessary (though of course not sufficient conditions) for the 
formation and enlargement of bubbles. Even in the case of tulipmania, when the mass media 
were hardly developed, the bubble phenomenon was an essentially urban one – in the 
Amsterdam and Haarlem metropolitan areas of the Netherlands. Rising wages and affluence of 
craft workers created conditions for these folks to meet in pubs and public places, to discuss 
the qualities of tulip varieties and to speculate on tulip bulbs. 
 
The three items in the last set of factors in Table 1 are about communications pertaining 
to the underlying assets. Movies and financial stocks have been eminently discussable topics for 
a long time – in mass media, parlors, clubs and pubs. The spread of Internet has boosted the 
ability to discuss, review and hype all asset types – including the prosaic asset categories of 
commodities comprising of things such as titanium or pork bellies. Of course, for highly 
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valenced and often emotive categories of entertainment products (movies, music, books), 
storied stocks (such as those of technology companies), and high-end real estate (Manhattan, 
London), the discussions – facilitated by Internet – have proliferated in terms of numbers and 
intensity.  
 
In the bubble process, the role of such communications is similar to the processes found 
in the formation of any “tipping point” (Gladwell, 2002). For a tipping point to form or a bubble 
to inflate rapidly, the following factors usually come into play: 
 Propitious Context: A fertile and propitious context is helpful. The dotcom tech-stock 
bubble could not have been formed until there were some early, dazzling successes in 
e-commerce. 
 Irresistible Stickiness: Some aspect of the phenomenon must be irresistibly attractive to 
large numbers. In the U.S. housing bubble, the real estate price gains in some sunbelt 
states (like Florida and California) appeared to offer sweet, ‘no-brainer’ strategies for 
sure-fire capital gains: buy now, and you are guaranteed a higher sale price later. 
 Nodal Roles: Central and nodal roles that advise, mentor, connect, and persuade are 
crucial for the propagation of an idea – including of course the idea behind a bubble, 
that an asset’s price will rise and rise and rise; or the dire counter warning that the 
asset is inflating in unsustainable ways and that the bubble will burst. Economist 
Nouriel Roubini, for example, was a lone wolf in warning about the inflating housing 
and stock bubble of 2007-8, and this earned him the nickname of “Dr. Doom”. Roubini 
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became a nodal and central celebrity once his warnings came true (see, for example, 
Chen, 2009; Das and Roubini, 2012). 
Boundary Meta-Dimensions of the Typology 
After identifying the core asset-linked dimensions of the bubble typology – availability, 
valuation and communication – it is useful to identify the boundaries, i.e., the limiting values of 
the core asset-linked dimensions comprising the typology. We identify four meta-dimensions 
that delineate the boundaries of the emergent typology: uncertainty, velocity over time, 
negotiated space, and sentiment-guiding theories (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Asset-related and Meta-Dimensions affecting Bubbles 
 
Uncertainty
Velocity over 
time
Sentiment-
guiding theories
Negotiated 
space
Sentiment
Perceived
asset 
communication
Perceived
asset 
availability
Perceived
asset value
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A key factor contributing to the bubble formation is the state of uncertainty (linked to 
the degree of newness of an underlying asset). We distinguish between uncertain and risky 
decision making situations. A risky situation is similar to rolling a dice that is balanced and fair: 
it is possible to assess the probability of the outcomes. An uncertain situation, on the other 
hand, resembles rolling a dice with infinite number of sides, without knowing whether the dice 
is balanced and fair. Under uncertainty thus, it is impossible to assess the probability of the 
outcomes. 
 
For example, under uncertain decision making situations the cash flow a new asset is 
expected to generate (the mean of the distribution) and the rate at which the cash flow should 
be discounted over time (the variance of the distribution) are unknown (Alvarez and Barney, 
2005). In other words, net present value cannot be calculated under uncertain decision making 
situations. The stage gets set, in other words, for feverish speculation (during bubble inflation) 
or for panicked exit (during bubble bursting). For example, during the dotcom boom, some 
futuristic predictions were driven by the prospects of the introduction of 3G mobile phones, 
adoption of smart cards, internet banking and data mining, to name a few: bank branches will 
disappear, 3G mobile phones will replace home computers, brands will die, prices will fall, and 
middlemen will be disintermediated (Coltman et al., 2001). 
 
We view uncertainty and newness of an underlying asset as two sides of the same coin. 
For an asset, uncertainty could arise from many sources: technical uncertainty (especially for 
high-tech products), market uncertainty (for mass market items), and goal ambiguity (Turcan, 
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2011). For some cutting edge products, such as a new genetic biotech therapy, both the 
availability of the asset to the market (will the genetics research and drug tests be successful?) 
as well as its value (how effective and unique will the drug be, and how big a market can be 
expected?) are unknown. Yet, communications – typically in rosy and optimistic terms – are 
provided to the market by the innovators and lead investors (Rutherford et al., 2009). As a 
result, an overall sentiment of the environmental context about the future is created within 
which the asset is embedded – a state that can be termed as ‘hype’ (Turcan, 2011).  
 
Assets with bubble potential also have a temporal dimension, velocity over time. That is, 
with elapsed time, a history about the asset is being formed, making stakeholders involved 
more knowledgeable about the asset, and in the end allowing them to make more accurate 
predictions about asset potential. In other words, with elapsed time and with growing 
experience and knowledge, the asset transitions from an uncertain state (unknown 
probabilities) to a risky state (known probabilities of outcomes). With such transition, it 
becomes possible to differentiate between hype (a crafted and slanted projection – a mythical 
one, if you will – of probability of success) and reality (a projection where probabilities of 
outcomes are calculable).  
 
In addition to the temporal dimension, we also introduce the enviro-contextual 
dimension. That is, regardless of the type of asset that is to be made available, valued, and 
communicated about, in the process of bubble formation a physical exchange usually does not 
take place. The tulips, for example, were in the ground while they were being traded in the 
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pubs of Amsterdam. We term this enviro-contextual dimension as negotiated space. In contrast 
to traditional (physical, palpable) marketplace exchange, in the negotiated space the parties 
arbitrate the value of an asset that is not readily available for physical inspection or exchange. 
Rather than speaking about a marketing mix, in the negotiated space there is a negotiated mix 
– product and place may have to be imagined, but elements of promotion (often hyped) and 
price (also hyped) are vividly present. 
 
Finally, sentiments about an asset’s value – current and anticipated – are linked strongly 
to people’s beliefs about the performance of the asset. People rely on sentiment-guiding 
theories.  Uncertainty, for example, diminishes with elapsed time – and eventually transforms 
into measurable risk.  Sentiments, on the other hand, are temporally sticky.  Once a sentiment 
is formed, it is very hard to challenge it and eventually to change it. What people tend to 
change instead are the theories they use to justify their sentiments.  We call these sentiment-
guiding theories. A sentiment often remains temporally invariant and sticky because a majority 
in the stakeholder network is willing to change the sentiment-guiding theory rather than the 
sentiment itself – and this helps in coping with the perceived uncertainty. With sticky 
sentiments, ‘theories’ become convenient and expendable and changeable: it is psychologically 
easy (less taxing) to change the guiding theory rather than to drop or reverse the sentiment. 
 
In the hype processes that lead to bubble formation, mid-level (or meso level) signals 
have a stronger effect on sentiments formation than macro level signals. For example, biotech 
investors pay less attention to the growth outlook of a nation issued by the European Union but 
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pay close attention to the growth prospects of the biotech sector from a reputable consulting 
or investment advisory firm. Overall sentiment – the sentiment of the multitude – arises from 
interaction among individuals and the changes in behavior which they induce in one another 
(Ormerod, 1998). In other words, positive feedback reinforces positive behavior, whereas 
negative feedback attenuates behavior – and these processes play out at an accelerated pace in 
the era of the Internet.   
 
Four types of the hype-related states may occur: (1) delusional optimism, (2) over-
optimism, (3) pessimism, and (4) realism talk (Turcan, 2011). Stakeholders are delusionally 
optimistic about an asset when sentiments about the future – in the environmental context 
within which the asset is embedded – are wildly positive. Reinforcing positive signals could 
come from meso as well as macro levels. Such delusional states typically do not last long. 
Stakeholders can be said to turn overoptimistic about an asset when they ignore negative 
signals emanating from the macro environment, and base their sentiments on the meso level 
signals which remain positive. When both macro and meso level signals turn negative, then 
sentiments usually sink – often in an extreme and precipitate manner. The sentimental milieu 
that emerges is that of pervasive skepticism or pessimism. Finally, realism talk propagates in a 
social network when the sentiments about the future from meso level are negative but signals 
from macro level are positive. The housing bubble (the bubble in residential real estate 
property prices) leading up to 2008 exhibited parts of such a cycle. Sentiments about real estate 
prices went from delusional optimism, to over-optimism, and entered a profound skepticism-
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pessimism phase – devoid of all hope – by early 2011. The likely next phase may entail moving 
into realism talk.  
The Typology of Bubbles 
Having pulled together the three core asset-linked dimensions – perceived asset 
availability, perceived asset value, and perceived asset communication; and the four boundary 
meta-dimensions (see Figure 1) – we propose a typology of bubbles. Table 2 depicts the basic 
typology and emerged bubble types; and Tables 3 and 4 profile the six bubble types in terms of 
the meta-dimensions (Table 3) and in terms of the asset-linked dimensions (Table 4).  
 
Table 2: The Typology of Bubbles 
Bubble Types Examples Comments Social Impacts 
Transient or 
Playful Bubble 
Massive failure of 
Disney sci-fi film 
‘John Carter’, 2012 
For one particular (usually 
entertainment) asset, hype far 
outpaces realism 
Individual persons or 
corporations may suffer, but 
such bubbles are socially 
harmless 
Inflating Bubble Social media stock 
valuations 2012 
Asset valuations are rising, but not 
too fast 
Major problems can be avoided 
if asset values are carefully 
monitored 
Deflating Bubble Gold prices – 1980 
to 1983 
Asset valuations are falling, but at 
precipitate speeds 
Major problems can be avoided 
if asset values are carefully 
monitored 
Contagious 
Bubble 
Dotcom E-
commerce 
valuations 1999 
Asset valuations are rising at hyper 
speed – everyone wants to be “in 
on the action” 
No visible locus of control – 
bubble has its own logic and 
momentum 
Irrational Bubble USA Housing 
valuations 2003-
2007 
Asset valuations are rising in 
inexplicable ways (Schiller 2006) 
Dangerous and unsustainable 
rise in valuations – often 
engineered by few 
Punctured 
Bubble 
Dotcom E-
commerce 
valuations in mid-
2000 
Asset valuations drop at precipitate 
speed – asset holders are 
paralyzed, then seek a quick exit 
Crisis state – huge loss of asset 
values and wealth, major 
bankruptcies 
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Table 3: Boundary Meta-Dimensions by Bubble Types 
 Uncertainty Velocity over time Negotiated 
space 
Sentiment-guiding 
theories 
Transient or Playful 
Bubble 
Low Uncertainty High Velocity Virtual Asset Over-optimism, 
sometimes Delusional 
Optimism 
Inflating Bubble Low Uncertainty Low and Decelerating 
Velocity 
Virtual Asset Over-optimism 
 
Deflating Bubble Low Uncertainty Low but Accelerating 
Velocity 
Virtual Asset Build up of Skepticism 
Contagious Bubble High 
Uncertainty 
High, first Accelerating 
Velocity; then 
Decelerating Velocity 
Virtual Asset Delusional Optimism 
(especially near the 
peak) 
Irrational Bubble High 
Uncertainty 
Low and Decelerating 
Velocity 
Palpable Asset Delusional Optimism 
(especially near the 
peak) 
Punctured Bubble High 
Uncertainty 
High and Accelerating 
Velocity 
Virtual Asset Profound Pessimism 
 
 
Table 4: Asset-linked Dimensions by Bubble Types 
 Perceived Asset Availability Perceived Asset Value Perceived Asset 
Communication 
Transient or Playful 
Bubble 
No (once the asset is 
available, it is valued very 
quickly and realistically) 
Wagerable (actual or mock 
bets are placed) 
Discussable, Reviewable, 
Hypeable 
Inflating Bubble Yes Tradable and wagerable 
(Bets tend to be well-
calculated) 
Discussable, Reviewable, 
Hypeable 
Deflating Bubble Yes Tradable and wagerable 
(Bets tend to be well-
calculated) 
Discussable, Reviewable 
Contagious Bubble Usually No (Trading is based 
on asset’s promise) 
Tradable and wagerable 
(rising loss of logic) 
Discussable and ultra-
Hypeable 
Irrational Bubble Yes Tradable and wagerable 
(rising loss of logic) 
Reviewable, Hypeable 
Punctured Bubble Yes (for palpable assets) or 
No (for virtual, promised 
assets) 
No Reviewable (but only after 
the shock phase) 
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Compared to the other five bubble types, transient or playful bubbles are the least 
socially harmful.  Particular individual investors or corporate executives may be hurt by the 
bursting of transient bubbles, but the social effects are minimal. Examples of such transient or 
playful bubbles occur occasionally in the movie making industry, specifically in the period prior 
to the movie release and immediately after. Though characterized by low uncertainty, the hype 
about certain movies as a virtual asset that is not yet released far outpaces realism, leading 
sometimes to over-optimism or delusional optimism. The 2012 Disney sci-fi film John Carter is a 
case in point: it cost over $300 million to make and market and earned only a disappointing $31 
million on the first weekend of release (Kay, 2012). The value put on such virtual asset depends 
chiefly on the previous experience the stakeholders have had with similar assets and on the 
extent and degree of its discussability and reviewability. Transient or playful bubbles move 
away from the uncertain state relatively fast, either reinforcing or dissipating the hype around 
the asset.  
 
Inflating bubbles are characterized by low uncertainty whereby the asset valuations are 
rising at a slow pace driven by an over-optimistic sentiment about the asset potential. The 
example of such bubbles is the 2011-2012 emergence of the social media bubble. Low 
uncertainty around an asset such as social media is driven by its availability in a vividly visible 
form, a form that facilitates understanding and actual experiencing of it. In the context of 
inflating bubbles, the velocity is low and decelerating. The asset value moves towards more 
uncertain settings, driven by the over-optimistic sentiments about the potential of the asset 
combined with the asset tradability and wagerability as well as asset discussability and 
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reviewability. Given the low velocity of the hype that is built around the asset, major problems 
associated with such bubble could be avoided, provided the values put on the asset are 
carefully monitored.  
 
Deflating bubbles are rarer – sometimes found in commodity markets. Gold prices 
deflated relatively fast (but not in a precipitate manner) during 1980-83 period, and continued 
to decline mildly or stagnate for the rest of the 20th century. Asset values decrease – at least at 
the deflation stage – at an accelerating velocity.  We characterize the deflating bubble with the 
following conditions: (1) low uncertainty decision-making setting, (2) driven by an overall 
skepticism about an asset potential, and (3) the asset is available, tradable, wagerable, 
discussable and reviewable. The low velocity associated with a deflating bubble, and thus the 
gradual rise in skepticism, may allow actors and policymakers to avoid major problems or 
potential negative effects by carefully monitoring the values of the assets. 
 
High uncertainty dominates the process of emergence of contagious bubbles that have 
their own logic and momentum with no visible locus of control. The Dotcom bubble (1999 e-
commerce valuations) is an eloquent example of such contagious bubbles. During such bubbles 
the virtual assets that are tradable and wagerable usually are not available for palpable 
exchange. The valuations of such assets are rising at hyper speeds, being driven by delusional 
optimism over the promises these assets make. Such bubbles have high, at first accelerating (an 
epidemiological process – contagion spreading fast) and then a decelerating velocity (every 
vulnerable entity is infected – the contagion slows down). There is hyper-speed movement 
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towards uncertain-decision making settings, making it hard for the stakeholders to learn and 
actually distinguish between hype and reality.  
 
Irrational bubbles resemble contagious bubbles in that they are also driven by high 
uncertainty, though low and decelerating velocity. Probably the key difference is in the 
availability of what we call palpability of assets – the assets are available to touch, see, feel – 
but the values are rising in inexplicable ways (Schiller, 2006). USA housing (residential property) 
valuations during 2003-2007 exemplify this type of bubble. Irrational bubbles are characterized 
by dangerous and unsustainable rise in valuations that are often engineered by few 
stakeholders, eventually leading to delusional optimism displaying the same contagion effects 
as in contagious bubbles. 
 
Punctured bubbles are characterized by high uncertainty and high, accelerating velocity. 
The system moves away from uncertain decision-making settings, and towards profound 
pessimism. An example of such bubbles is the dotcom (e-commerce) valuations in mid-2000. 
Although the underlying assets may or may not be available for palpable exchange, during such 
punctured bubbles asset valuations drop at precipitate speed, and asset holders are paralyzed 
at first (like in a traumatic fire) and then start looking for a quick exit. Effectively the system is in 
a crisis state whereby huge losses of asset values and wealth are encountered, and major 
bankruptcies are witnessed.  
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Concluding Comments 
In this viewpoint paper we aimed at defining the typology of bubbles and its 
dimensions. We approached this task inductively by drawing from empirical realm but also 
employing the emergent theoretical frames from ongoing work on bubbles. We have identified 
five types of bubbles: transient or playful, inflating, deflating, contagious, irrational, and 
punctured bubbles. For each type we have identified four meta-dimensions that delineate the 
boundaries of the typology: uncertainty, velocity over time, negotiated space, and sentiment-
guiding theory. Furthermore, we have identified three dimensions that are linked to the assets 
themselves that underlie the bubble phenomena: perceived asset availability, perceived asset 
value, and perceived asset communication.  
 
We have discussed each type along the above mentioned meta- and asset-linked 
dimensions by comparing and contrasting bubbles in the fields of entertainment, technology, 
commodities, housing, and stock markets. In this process we have highlighted major challenges 
and issues that characterize each bubble type, including those that may affect bubble 
manageability.  
 
A promising area for research is to contrast and compare the relationship between 
sentiment-guiding theories and sentiments within and across each bubble type (within the 
scope of boundary meta- and asset-linked dimensions). This may lead, with a sustained stream 
of research efforts, to the development of a robust behavioral grand theory of bubbles.  
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